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SUMMARY
Patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and their families must confront two fundamental truths. First, AD is
a uniformly progressive disease that ultimately results in debilitating cognitive impairment. Second, although
there is now evidence that some medications may produce transient improvement or possibly even slowing of
disease progression, there is currently no way to halt the progression of AD. Consequently, patients and their
families consistently ask the following questions: 1. What new management issues can be anticipated, and
when? 2. What clinical developments are atypical and merit evaluation for a superimposed problem? 3. Is the
current treatment working? These questions can only be answered by referring to the natural course of AD,
and specically, information regarding measures of functional impairment and how they change over time.
The information that is currently available on this topic is limited and often embodies implicit assumptions
that have not been adequately tested. This information will be reviewed, and directions for future research
will be outlined. Copyright ? 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1. INTRODUCTION
Progressive cognitive impairment is a fundamental characteristic of Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
Accurate measurement of progression is essential for the evaluation of therapeutic interventions, and
it is also important in many other avenues of research, ranging from studies of clinicopathological
relationships to investigations of public health issues. This has prompted the development of a wide
variety of assessment instruments, each designed to suit particular research needs. In principle,
these instruments could also be extremely valuable in guiding individual patient management, but
this application has received relatively little attention. In this review, I will explore the extent to
which currently available assessment instruments pertain to the practical management issues that
confront patients and their caregivers. I will not evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the instruments as research tools; these have been summarized in several recent reviews [1–5].
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2. COGNITIVE TESTING
The most direct way to measure severity of dementia is to test cognitive function, either with a
comprehensive neuropsychological battery or with one of the abbreviated assessment instruments
that have been designed for this purpose [4; 6–11]. Results of these tests are often dicult to apply
to practical management issues, however. A patient’s ability to copy a drawing of intersecting
pentagons does not have obvious implications for caregivers, for example, and the ability to count
backwards by seven does not readily translate into a skill that is required in daily activities.
Although the practical relevance is more apparent for some of the more fundamental tasks included
in the batteries, such as orientation to person, place and time, or the ability to name simple
objects, caregivers usually do not require the assistance of a professional to know when patients
have decits in these tasks. At times, fundamental decits can remain unrecognized because of a
patient’s ability to compensate for them, or because of denial or lack of insight on the part of
caretakers, but these situations are not common. Conversely, formal cognitive testing can sometimes
identify intellectual abilities that are relatively preserved and that can be incorporated by patients
and caregivers into compensatory strategies, but it may be just as reasonable to try those strategies
empirically and abandon the ones that are not helpful.
Even though most of the items on standard cognitive assessment batteries are not directly rel-
evant to signicant management issues, the items might still have clinical value if it could be
shown that they function as reliable surrogates for important practical abilities. For example, all
patients with AD will eventually reach a point where they do not have adequate visuospatial
skills, motor sequencing abilities, reaction times, judgement, or reasoning skills to drive safely,
but it can be very dicult to determine precisely when they have reached that point [12–21].
Dementia in and of itself does not preclude the ability to drive. Premature restrictions on driving
can undermine a patient’s mobility and sense of autonomy unnecessarily, yet delayed recognition
of serious impairment has obvious safety implications both for the patient and for society. Patients
often lack the insight necessary to detect their impaired driving performance, and, indeed, they
may retain enough ‘instinctive’ ability to perform adequately in routine circumstances. Too often,
the rst convincing evidence that a patient is too impaired to drive safely comes when the patient
is involved in one or more accidents. A reliable indicator of a patient’s capacity to drive safely
would be enormously valuable. For the indicator to be clinically useful, a high positive predictive
value would be required; a simple statistical correlation would not be sucient. In fact, even the
mini-mental status examination (MMSE) score has a moderate correlation with driving ability, but
the relationship is not strong enough to predict driving performance for any individual [14–21].
Measures of reaction time or visual attention may prove to be reliable indicators of driving safety
[14; 19; 20], but this has not yet been established conclusively.
Although driving safety has received the most attention, other important aspects of practical
management could conceivably be assessed by using cognitive test instruments [1; 22–24]. In prin-
ciple, there could even be a surrogate measure of legal competence. While that seems unlikely,
surrogate measures of ability to cook, handle nances, or other tasks required to live independently
would be extremely helpful to the clinician and caregivers, if cut-o values could be established
that distinguished competent from incompetent patients with a high sensitivity and specicity. This
would require the identication of a measure that had a much stronger correlation with the clinical
variable of interest than has been established for any measure to date [25], or else the identi-
cation through multivariate analysis of a combination of measures that had high predictive
power.
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Even if static cognitive measures did not correlate with individual performance of concrete tasks,
it is possible that the rate of change of those measures might. Another potential application of the
rate of change could be the identication of individual patients with a rate of disease progression
that was faster or slower than expected [1; 26–29]. This could be helpful in evaluating response to
a treatment, or in recognizing superimposed disease processes. To be used in this way, a cognitive
measure would need to change in a reliable way as AD progresses, with very little variation
between patients in the rate of progression [26; 30].
3. GLOBAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
A single measure that roughly summarizes a patient’s overall level of impairment can be used
to screen candidates for clinical research, to group patients when analysing data, or to assess
the outcome of an intervention [2; 4; 31–35]. The value of a global measure in routine clinical
practice is less apparent, however. What is to be gained by knowing whether a patient has ‘mild’,
‘moderate’, or ‘severe’ disease? Although caregivers often seem to appreciate having a frame of
reference, their response to the information may be as much a function of their own outlook as
anything else. Some caregivers will be reassured and comforted by the knowledge that a patient is
‘only stage 1’, for example, whereas others will be depressed by the realization that things can only
get worse. Conversely, some caregivers will be disheartened when told that a patient is severely
impaired, while others will see it as a validation of the burden they have been experiencing.
There are at least two ways in which global measures could conceivably be useful in clinical
practice. First, if there were a treatment strategy that produced a robust improvement in global
function but only in a subgroup of patients, then global assessment instruments would provide
an ecient way to decide which patients should continue to receive the treatment. Second, if
the severity of AD, as assessed by a global assessment instrument, progressed in an extremely
reproducible way, then the rating could be used both for prognostic purposes and to detect depar-
tures from the expected rate of progression due to superimposed disease processes or a therapeutic
intervention.
Before a global scale can be used to direct patient management, however, the assumptions
underlying the scale must be considered. By denition, global scales combine information about
patients’ performance across a wide range of cognitive domains. The way in which this information
is combined necessarily reects implicit or explicit assumptions about the disease process. As an
illustration, consider the Global Deterioration Scale (GDS), a widely used seven-point scale in
which each stage is dened by describing representative decits that a patient at that stage would
typically exhibit [31]. For example, a patient at stage 5 (moderately severe cognitive decline) ‘may
have diculty counting backward from 40 by 4s or from 20 by 2s’. People at this stage ‘require
no assistance with toileting or eating but may have some diculty choosing the proper clothing to
wear...’. They ‘invariably know their own names and generally know their spouses’ and children’s
names’. This presupposes that the decits of AD progress in an orderly fashion in parallel across
cognitive domains. If there are any patients who are incontinent or unable to remember their own
names but who still retain the ability to calculate, it is not clear how those patients should be
classied.
One way to address this problem is to assign a separate rating to a patient’s performance
in each of a variety of domains, and then to combine these ratings into a global score. This
approach still presupposes that the decits within a particular domain progress in a predictable
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order in patients with AD, but this is more a reection of the complexity of specic tasks than an
assumption about the disease itself. An example of this type of instrument is the Clinical Dementia
Rating (CDR) [32], in which patients receive a score of 0 (no impairment), 0.5 (questionable
impairment), 1 (mild impairment), 2 (moderate impairment), or 3 (severe impairment) in six
independently rated categories: memory; orientation; judgement and problem solving; community
aairs; home and hobbies; and personal care. As with the GDS, each score is dened by describing
representative decits, but this time each description is conned to decits within a single domain.
The global CDR is computed from the six component scores using an algorithm in which memory
is considered the primary score and all others are secondary.
Unlike the GDS, in which assumptions about the progression of decits across domains are
inherent in the structure of the rating system, the structure of the CDR does not intrinsically
require any assumptions about disease progression. The algorithm for computing the global rating
does embody such assumptions, however. Indeed, when the CDR was originally published [32],
the authors assumed that the secondary scores would always cluster tightly around the memory
score. As a result, the algorithm does not permit calculation of an unambiguous global score for
many combinations in which the component scores are somewhat dispersed [36].
When the CDR was adopted by the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease
(CERAD), the algorithm was presented in a way that eliminated these indeterminate cases. None
the less, the new formulation of the algorithm still incorporated the assumption that the component
scores would always cluster tightly around the memory score. If this assumption is invalid, then
some counterintuitive and undesirable situations can occur [36]. For example, a decrease in a
component score can produce an increase in the global score. Indeed, this type of inconsistency
occurs in 5 per cent of all near-match pairs (two sets of component scores that are identical except
for a single component score) – the set with the higher component score is assigned a lower global
CDR. In an additional 1 per cent of near match pairs, the algorithm produces an anomaly in which
the global score increases by two points or more when a component score increases by one point
or less. This is not simply a theoretical concern; these undesirable combinations represented 12 per
cent of the CDR determinations in one registry of patients with AD, and were also present in the
CERAD database [36; 37]. A modied version of the CDR algorithm was subsequently published
[38], but it failed to eliminate this type of inconsistency [37].
Alternative algorithms exist. The ‘sum of boxes’ score [39], which is conceptually equivalent
to calculating the mean of the six category scores, avoids logical inconsistencies but abandons the
original emphasis on the memory score. Another published algorithm retains the emphasis on the
memory score and eliminates logical inconsistencies by dening the global CDR as the median of
the six category scores; when the median falls between two category scores, the one closer to the
memory score is chosen as the global CDR [36].
Any attempt to develop a single numerical measure to summarize something as complex and
multifaceted as the severity of AD inevitably requires assumptions about disease progression. The
assumptions underlying a global assessment instrument may not be immediately apparent, but they
should be carefully analysed before the instrument is adopted.
4. FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
Functional assessment instruments are attempts to quantify patients’ abilities to perform routine
practical tasks, including self-care activities (ADLs, or activities of daily living) and tasks that
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require the use of tools (IADLs, or instrumental activities of daily living) [4; 40–47]. Unlike cog-
nitive testing, for which practical clinical relevance is a signicant concern, functional assessment
measures translate readily into concrete issues of patient management. The main thing that limits
the clinical utility of functional assessment scales is the fact that the information is derived almost
exclusively from caregivers’ reports. Although some ADLs and IADLs can be evaluated directly in
a controlled setting [44; 45], this is time-consuming and not necessarily representative of patients’
performance in their usual environment. Thus, functional assessment instruments typically require
questioning a caregiver. Since a clinician caring for a patient would do this routinely, it is not
clear that there is anything to gain by coding the information in terms of the discrete, standard-
ized categories required for a formal assessment instrument. One potential advantage of using the
assessment instrument could be that it would ensure that the clinician did not forget to ask about
signicant practical issues, but this objective could also be met by using a checklist of topics,
without constraining the clinician to conform to the response categories of a specic instrument.
A functional assessment instrument could conceivably be useful to a clinician trying to determine
whether a patient had improved in response to a medication or some other therapeutic intervention,
but it is probably better to use cognitive tests or global scales for this purpose because placebo
eects could cast doubt on a measure that is based purely on caregiver reporting. In principle,
functional assessment instruments that had predictive power could be useful to the clinician. For
example, if there were evidence that a particular pattern on an assessment instrument reliably
identied those individuals who would have diculty with toileting within a year, that would be
very useful in counselling caregivers about the need to plan for support services or placement.
As with cognitive tests and global scales, a general statistical correlation would not be adequate
for this purpose; to be applicable to patient care, the pattern would have to predict with a high
degree of condence when an individual patient would reach a specic endpoint, preferably an
endpoint limited to a single functional domain. Some functional assessment scales resemble global
rating scales in that they group performance across domains [41; 48]; as with the global scales, the
grouping procedure necessarily embodies assumptions about disease progression that could result
in misleading predictions.
5. SEVERE IMPAIRMENT BATTERIES
For research purposes, it is important to have measures of disease progression even late in the
course, when performance on many clinical, neuropsychological and functional tests tend to show
oor eects [49; 50]. By the time these stages are reached, however, it is usually not particularly
important for the clinician to have an accurate measure of disease progression. The relevant infor-
mation can generally be obtained by asking a few simple questions about basic daily functions.
Thus, the severe impairment batteries that have been developed have very little clinical utility. The
most likely exception would be if one of these batteries were shown to be strongly predictive (on
an individual level, not just a group level) for mortality.
6. BEHAVIOURAL RATING SCALES
Behavioural manifestations of AD, such as depression, agitation, hallucinations and delusions,
can have profound signicance for patient management, but they have typically been ignored in
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the kinds of rating scales discussed above. There have been several recent attempts to develop
rating instruments for these aspects of the disease [3; 51–54]. As with the functional assessment
instruments, these rely on caregiver reporting, so in principle they could be redundant for clinicians
who are already obtaining complete histories from caregivers. In practice, however, clinicians
probably tend to ignore many of these behavioural problems unless caregivers think to report
them. Moreover, clinicians may not nd these issues as intuitive as they nd ADLs and IADLs,
so the specic response categories provided by a rating instrument are probably useful. In principle,
behavioural rating scales could also be clinically useful if there were evidence that a certain pattern
of results reliably identied when individual patients were likely to experience a specic outcome.
7. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
It would be very helpful for clinicians to be able to predict when patients with AD are likely
to lose the ability to perform specic functions. The instruments that are already available for
measuring disease progression might provide one way to accomplish this, but only if specic
measures could be shown to have predictive power at an individual level, not just at a group
level. An essential rst step would be to determine which aspects of AD are most distressing
to patients and caregivers, in terms of both emotional and nancial burden [54–56]. Functional
assessment instruments that optimally address those functions could then be selected as outcome
measures, making each behaviour an independent outcome (rather than grouping functions together
and incorporating unnecessary and unwarranted assumptions).
It would also be helpful for clinicians to know when their patients with AD deviated signicantly
from the expected pattern of disease progression. For this purpose, it is essential to use global
instruments that do not impose unwarranted assumptions about disease progression. Here, too,
general statements about group averages are of limited clinical utility; the ideal must be to identify
individual patients who are progressing in ways that are outside the expected range of variation
for the population.
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